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Scholars of legislative politics have typically analysed leg-
islative productivity by looking at the number of successful 
parliamentary policy proposals (e.g. Binder, 2003; Howell 
et al., 2000). Recently, legislative works have shifted their 
focus towards understanding the timing of legislative deci-
sions. They yield important insights into the determinants 
of legislative delay by showing that factors such as public 
opinion, the coalition bargaining process and various insti-
tutions directly influence the duration of policy-making 
(Golub, 2008; Golub and Steunenberg, 2007; Klüver and 
Sagarzazu, 2013; Schulz and König, 2000; Taylor, 2014; 
Woon and Anderson, 2012). Despite substantial theoretical 
and empirical development, few scholars consider the role 
of intra-party conflict. This absence is striking as numerous 
studies show that intra-party preferences hold implications 
for a large range of political processes such as election 
campaigns, coalition bargaining and issue selection (Carey, 
2009; Ceron, 2012; Debus and Bräuninger, 2008; Greene 
and Haber, 2014; Kam, 2009; Laver, 1999). Moreover, the 
studies that take into account actors’ ideological diversity 
(Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2013; Taylor, 2014; Woon and 
Anderson, 2012) mostly use indirect preference measures, 
which are endogenous to the parliamentary processes that 
they are intended to predict.
This paper presents and tests a theory of legislative deci-
sion-making speed by considering disagreements within 
the governing party and its distance to the parliamentary 
opposition. I argue that intra-party conflict makes it more 
difficult for the government to form the legislative majori-
ties necessary to pass laws quickly, especially if its prefer-
ences are further away from the opposition. Until recently, 
measuring intra-party preferences has been a challenging 
task because of limited data availability and the lack of 
adequate methods. This paper introduces a direct way of 
gauging parliamentary actors’ ideological preferences by 
analysing speeches given at party national congresses in the 
UK over a 10-year period. I follow recent research on 
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political documents (Ceron, 2012; Greene and Haber, 2014) 
and derive preference estimates using the scaling method 
WORDFISH, which uses word frequencies to generate 
actors’ ideological positions (Slapin and Proksch, 2008). I 
then use these estimates to study the relationship between 
intra-governmental disagreement and legislative decision-
making speed.
In the next section, I present the paper’s underlying theo-
retical framework about the effects of intra-party conflict on 
the timing of legislative decisions. I then introduce the novel 
dataset and present evidence that conflict within the govern-
ing party leads to longer bill durations. This research holds 
important implications for broad theories of parliamentary 
politics and further advances our understanding of the influ-
ence of intra-party conflict on legislative processes.
Internal cohesion and legislative 
activity
Governments seeking re-election usually have large incen-
tives to pass their bills quickly. They must fulfil their elec-
toral promises within a finite time frame and often face 
additional societal and economic pressure to enact reform on 
salient issues. Nevertheless, governments sometimes cannot 
avoid legislative delay (Döring, 2003). Spatial theories gen-
erally assume that government leaders will hold preferences 
that approximate their party’s median position (Laver and 
Shepsle, 1996; Tsebelis, 2002). When a government initiates 
policy proposals they are likely to be close to the party 
median. However, the government’s preferences often arise 
from internal debates over the best approach to implement-
ing policy goals, as well as real differences in the preferences 
of each coalition partner. Moreover, governments must rec-
oncile their statements with a broad party membership 
(Harmel and Janda, 1994) and therefore require intra-party 
unity to govern effectively.
In parliament, MPs of the governmental majority not 
only try to appeal to their constituents but often also repre-
sent the preferences of specific intra-party factions (Spirling 
and Quinn, 2010). Although the government has substantial 
power to initiate legislation, MPs have several ways of 
influencing the speed of legislative proposals. They can ask 
parliamentary questions, call for public hearings and intro-
duce amendments. Most importantly, MPs can directly 
influence the proceeding of a bill in the committee stage, 
especially if they chair a committee. The more diverse the 
preferences within the governmental party, the larger the 
likelihood that MPs represent factional interests that deviate 
from the party’s median position. Proposals approximating 
the preferences of the party median gain less support from 
MPs with more extreme preferences. Intra-party conflict 
does not necessarily lead to legislative gridlock. Strong 
party leaders, internal party rules and characteristics of the 
parliamentary system can lessen the effect of internal disa-
greement on legislative policies (Ceron, 2012). Nevertheless, 
intra-party conflict is likely to increase the time it takes to 
reach policy agreements, particularly in systems where 
party leaders have fewer incentives to prevent dissidents 
from expressing their views in parliament (Proksch and 
Slapin, 2012).
Assuming that individual MPs represent the interest of 
intra-party factions, and that they mainly support proposals 
that are closest to their own preferences, I therefore predict 
that bills take longer to pass when there is a greater varia-
tion of preferences within the governing party.
H1 (Conflict): When conflict within the governing party 
increases, governmental legislative proposals take longer 
to pass.
The duration of legislative proposals not only depends on 
support from the governmental majority but also on support 
from the opposition. Although the opposition often cannot 
block legislation when the government has a stable major-
ity, they can still directly influence the speed by which a bill 
passes through parliament using the institutional tools 
available to them. Although members of the opposition 
generally seek to delay governmental proposals, they will 
put more effort into delaying legislation when the proposals 
are further away from their own preferences. I therefore 
predict that the mean ideological distance of the govern-
ment party from the opposition influences the speed of leg-
islative proposals.
H2 (Distance): When the government party’s mean posi-
tion moves away from the mean position of the opposi-
tion, governmental legislative proposals take longer to 
pass.
Data and methods
To test these hypotheses, I collected information on the leg-
islative activity in the UK Parliament and speeches given at 
the Labour and Conservative parties’ annual national con-
ferences between 1999 and 2009. The UK’s party system 
makes the country an interesting case to study the effects of 
intra-party divisions on the timing of legislative decisions. 
The country was governed by a stable, single-party Labour 
government from 1997 to 2010 when the Conservative 
Party and Liberal Democrats formed the first coalition gov-
ernment in the UK since the Second World War. This is 
important as coalition governments make it difficult to iso-
late the effect of intra-party conflict on legislative deci-
sions. The UK’s party system is also characterized by a 
large degree of intra-party fractionalization, particularly 
within the two main parties Labour and Conservatives 
(Turner, 2000). Conflict between different party factions, 
for example, was one of main reasons for the emergence of 
the Liberal Democrats party. Believing that Labour had 
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become too left-wing, a group of four Labour members left 
the party in 1981 to create the Social Democratic Party that 
later merged with the Liberals to form the Liberal 
Democrats. If evidence from the UK confirms the theory, 
then we may see similar processes underway in other 
advanced industrial democracies.
Measuring the legislative decision-making speed
To measure the duration of legislative decisions, I collected 
all bills introduced in the UK Parliament from the begin-
ning of the legislative term in 1997 until the end of the 
Labour government in 2010. I extracted the information 
from the House of Common’s Sessional Information 
Digest, which provides an overview of the legislative activ-
ity for each session of the UK Parliament.1 In the UK 
Parliament, bills are introduced in either the House of 
Commons or the House of Lords by the government, indi-
vidual MPs or Lords and private individuals. Bills can be 
public, private or hybrid, depending on whether they apply 
to the general population or specific groups of individuals. 
They have to pass both Houses before they are presented to 
the monarch for approval. The final data set includes all 
public bills introduced by the government or members of 
the governmental majority (private members’ bills) that 
succeeded in becoming law. I measure the duration of the 
legislative process for each bill by calculating the number 
of calendar days from the date the bill was first introduced 
in either the House of Commons or the House of Lords 
until the date that bill received Royal Assent and became an 
Act of Parliament. Figure 1 shows the average bill duration 
and the respective range for each legislative session. The 
graph illustrates that it takes about 200 days for a bill to 
become a law. Bills introduced in a session preceding a 
general election receive Royal Assent much more quickly.
Measuring disagreement and distance
Capturing the government party’s internal disagreement and 
the distance to the opposition requires information about the 
location of actors’ ideological preferences. Although schol-
ars have employed numerous ways of measuring parties’ 
internal cohesiveness using, for example, roll call votes 
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) and legislative speeches 
(Proksch and Slapin, 2008), most of these methods are 








































































Figure 1. Law-making duration in the UK Parliament. 
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study (Loewenberg, 2008). Similar to recent studies of intra-
party politics (Greene and Haber, 2014), I estimate the par-
ties’ ideological preferences by analysing speeches given at 
the parties’ national conferences. Party congresses are usu-
ally held once a year and offer MPS and other delegates a 
relatively unconstrained platform to voice their opinions. 
Specifically, I collected all available conference speeches 
given by Labour and Conservative party members after the 
1997 general election and before the general election in 
2010.2 Unfortunately, the speeches are not readily available 
online as both parties have deleted their speech archive over 
time. However, using the Wayback Machine, a website that 
captures historical snapshots of webpages, and a self-pro-
grammed web crawler, I managed to collect almost all pre-
viously listed conference speeches. In total, I compiled 
complete sets of conference speeches for both parties from 
1999 to 2009. Speeches from previous conferences are 
either incomplete or could not be recovered and are not 
included in the analysis. The average number of yearly con-
ference speeches for both parties is 35 and varies very little 
over time (see Figure 2). The final dataset includes 211 
Labour speeches and 179 Conservative speeches.
I use the statistical scaling method WORDFISH (Slapin 
and Proksch, 2008) to estimate positions from these docu-
ments. WORDFISH uses word frequencies to estimate 
actors’ positions on a single dimensional scale and does not 
require reference documents, in contrast to other scaling 
approaches such as WORDSCORES (Laver et al., 2003).3 
The model assumes that the words in a document reflect the 
author’s ideological position on an underlying dimension. I 
estimate separate WORDFISH models for each party’s con-
ference and year. Before applying the WORDFISH model I 
transform the documents to plain text, delete headers and 
footers and everything that is not part of the author’s speech. 
I also remove stop words, numbers and punctuation, and 
apply the Porter stemming algorithm to reduce words to their 
word stems.4 The processed documents are then converted 
into a term document matrix with word counts for all 
documents.
The model returns position estimates for each document, 
which indicate if individual speakers or the party as a whole 
changed their ideological positions over time. I measure the 
parties’ internal level of conflict by calculating the total var-
iance of estimated position for each conference and year. To 
measure the absolute distance between Labour and 
Conservative I use each party’s yearly mean position. Figure 
2 displays how both parties’ internal disagreement changed 
over a period of 10 years and in relation to the general elec-
tions in 2001 and 2005. It also displays the number of con-
ference speeches for both parties in each year. Figure 2 
illustrates that both parties’ level of conflict has varied 
greatly over time. Labour’s level of internal disagreement, 
for example, decreased by almost 50% after Gordon Brown 
replaced Tony Blair as Prime Minister and party leader. 
Both parties became increasing more divided in the run-up 
to the general elections, and. in the case of Labour, showed 
higher levels of disagreement even after the elections.
Additional control variables
In addition to the main independent variables, I also account 
for other factors that might influence the duration of legisla-
tive decisions. To control for the size of the governmental 












































Figure 2. The Labour and Conservative intra-party disagreement. 
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has in the House of Commons. I also include the ‘Days until 
the end of session’ and ‘Days until the end of term’ to account 
for parliamentary and legislative cycles, particularly the 
increase in legislative activity at the end of each session. 
Finally, I match the parliamentary data set with the data col-
lection of the UK Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) 
(Bevan et al., 2011; John et al., 2013) to control for the impact 
of the ‘Public agenda’ and ‘Financial bills’.5 I expect that the 
government will try to pass bills more quickly if the public 
believes them to be salient and if the bill is introduced annu-
ally and authorizes government spending, such as the 
Consolidated Fund and Appropriation Bills.
Estimation
Similar to other recent studies on the duration of legislative 
decisions (Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2013; Taylor, 2014; 
Woon and Anderson, 2012), I use survival analysis and esti-
mate a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). The Cox model 
describes how the covariates affect the risk that a bill will 
become a law in relation to a baseline hazard rate. The 
model assumes hazard functions that are proportional (i.e. 
constant) over time and I use Schoenfeld residuals to test 
proportionality of the data. The test indicates that the 
‘Financial bills’ variable violates the proportionality 
assumption. I follow Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn’s (2001) 
suggestion and account for this by including the variable as 
a time variant coefficient and by interacting it with the nat-
ural logarithm of time (ln (t)).
Results
Using the estimates of the parties’ ideological preferences 
and level of disagreement, I test the hypotheses on the dura-
tion of legislative decisions. Table 1 reports the effects of 
each covariate as raw coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Negative coefficients indicate that the risk that 
a bill will become a law decreases while positive coeffi-
cients indicate that the risk increases.
The results largely support the hypotheses. I predict in the 
‘Conflict’ hypothesis (H1) that internal disagreement within 
the governing party will increase the duration of legislative 
decisions. The coefficient for internal disagreement is in the 
predicted direction and statistically significant: the larger 
Labour’s internal disagreement, the lower the likelihood of a 
bill passing. The second hypothesis, ‘Distance’ (H2), pre-
dicts that bill duration gets larger as the mean distance 
between Labour and Conservative increases. The coefficient 
is also negative and statistically different from zero, which 
supports the theoretical expectations: Bills pass parliament 
more quickly when the distance between the Labour and 
Conservative parties’ ideological preferences decreases.
To illustrate the effects of the two main predictors, 
Figure 3 graphically shows the risk of a bill becoming a law 
when intra-governmental disagreement changes from its 
minimum to the maximum values.6 The solid line is the pre-
dicted percentage change (with 95% confidence intervals) 
in the risk of a bill passing as Labour’s internal disagree-
ment increases. The figure illustrates that the likelihood 
that a bill is passed strongly decreases with higher levels of 
intra-party conflict.
Figure 4 shows how the absolute distance between the 
Labour and Conservative mean positions impacts the likeli-
hood that a bill will pass. The effect is similar to the change 
in intra-governmental disagreement. The risk of a bill pass-
ing strongly decreases as the mean distance between the 
two parties increases. The predicted probabilities are con-
sistent with the expectation from the two hypotheses. High 
levels of internal disagreement and a large distance to the 
main opposition party make it more difficult for the govern-
ment to pass laws quickly.
The coefficients for the other covariates are also in the 
expected direction and statistically significant. Bills pass 
more quickly when the government controls a large majority 
of ‘Seats’, when the involved issue is salient on the ‘Public 
agenda’ and when the proposals are ‘Financial bills’. The 
number of ‘Days until the end of session’ and the legislative 
‘term’ show that bills receive Royal Assent more quickly if 
they are introduced at the beginning of the legislative term or 
at the end of the legislative session. The reason is that bills 
are usually dropped if they fail to pass before prorogation.
Conclusions
Altogether, the findings are consistent with the theoretical 
expectations. Based on the analysis of 380 speeches by 
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Standard errors in parentheses.
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Labour and the Conservatives, and over 300 Acts of 
Parliament from 1999 to 2010, I find that conflict within the 
governmental party and distance to the opposition lengthen 
the duration of legislative proposals. The results help to tell a 
compelling story of parliamentary behaviour in the UK and 
provide a clear first test of the impact of intra-party disagree-
ment on legislative politics. Future analyses would benefit 
from comparative analysis across parliamentary systems and 
different electoral institutions to better explain this approach’s 
broader applicability to other advanced democracies.
These results complement recent studies on policy dura-
tion (Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2013; Taylor, 2014; Woon and 
Anderson, 2012), which show that the speed of legislative 
decisions depends on the ideological distance between differ-
ent veto players. I add that bills take longer to adopt with 
increasing distance between the government and the opposi-
tion party’s mean positions. Moreover, by showing the exist-
ence and the consequences of distinct intra-party preferences, 
the results support recent research on intra-party politics from 
political documents (Ceron, 2012; Greene and Haber, 2014). 
Finally, this research holds important implications for broad 
theories of legislative politics and parties’ performance in 
government. Understanding the causes of legislative delay 
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productivity. Governments require intra-party unity to govern 
effectively. Parties that are internally divided make it more 
difficult for governments to respond quickly to external 
events and enact necessary reforms.
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Notes
1. The reports are available at: www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm/cmsid.htm.
2. I was not able to find complete sets of conference speeches 
for the Liberal Democrats before 2006. However, this 
should not bias the results too much as the party controlled 
only about 8% of the seats in the House of Commons from 
1997–2010.
3. For a detailed discussion about the underlying assumptions 
of the WORDFISH technique and how to apply the model to 
party member speeches, see Greene and Haber, 2014.
4. The preparatory steps mostly follow Grimmer and Stewart’s 
suggestions on how to prepare documents for automatic text 
classification (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013).
5. To do this, I first matched each law to the CAP’s topic cat-
egories. I then added the public attention to each issue. The 
CAP data can be accessed on the project’s website: http://
policyagendasuk.wordpress.com/datasets/
6. The solid black line indicates the predicted change in the 
relative risk that a bill will become a law as the level of intra-
governmental conflict increases. The primary independent 
variables are held at their means. The dashed lines around 
the solid line represent 95% confidence intervals based on 
simulations using 1000 draws from the estimated variance–
covariance matrix from the results presented in Table 1. For 
more information on how to estimate predicted probabilities 
from Cox models, see Licht (2011).
References
Bevan S, John P and Jennings W (2011) Keeping party pro-
grammes on track: The transmission of the policy agendas 
of executive speeches to legislative outputs in the United 
Kingdom. European Political Science Review 3(3): 395–417.
Binder SA (2003) Stalemate: Causes and consequences of legis-
lative gridlock. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Box–Steffensmeier JM and Zorn CJW (2001) Duration mod-
els and proportional hazards in political science. American 
Journal of Political Science 45(4): 972–988.
Carey J (2009) Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Ceron A (2012) Bounded oligarchy: How and when factions 
constrain leaders in party position–taking. Electoral Studies 
31(4): 689–701.
Debus M and Bräuninger T (2008) Intra–party factions and coa-
lition bargaining in Germany. In: Gianetti D and Benoit 
K (eds) Intra–Party Politics and Coalition Governments. 
London: Routledge, pp.121–145.
Döring H (2003) Party discipline and government imposition of 
restrictive rules. The Journal of Legislative Studies 9(4): 
147–163.
Golub J (2008) The study of decision–making speed in the 
European Union: Methods, data and theory. European Union 
Politics 9(1): 167–179.
Golub J and Steunenberg B (2007) How time affects EU deci-
sion–making. European Union Politics 8(4): 555–566.
Greene Z and Haber M (2014) Leadership competition and disa-
greement at party national congresses. British Journal of 
Political Science. Available on CJO 2014. DOI: 10.1017/
S0007123414000283.
Grimmer J and Stewart B (2013) Text as data: The promise and 
pitfalls of automatic content analysis methods for political 
texts. Political Analysis 21(3): 267–297.
Harmel R and Janda K (1994) An integrated theory of party goals 
and party change. Journal of Theoretical Politics 6(3): 259–
287.
Howell W, Adler S, Cameron C, et al. (2000) Divided government 
and the legislative productivity of Congress, 1945–1994. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 25(2): 285–312.
John P, Bertelli A, Jennings W, et al. (2013) Policy Agendas in 
British Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kam C (2009) Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Klüver H and Sagarzazu I (2013) Ideological congruency and 
decision–making speed: The effect of partisanship across 
European Union institutions. European Union Politics 14(3): 
388–407.
Laver M (1999) Divided parties, divided government. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 2(1): 5–29.
Laver M and Shepsle K (1996) Making and Breaking 
Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary 
Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Laver M, Benoit K and Garry J (2003) Extracting policy positions 
from political texts using words as data. American Political 
Science Review 97(2): 311–331.
Licht AA (2011) Change comes with time: Substantive interpre-
tation of non-proportional hazards in event history analysis. 
Political Analysis 19(2): 227–243.
Loewenberg G (2008) The contribution of comparative research 
to measuring the policy preferences of legislators. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 33(4): 501–510.
Poole KT and Rosenthal H (1997) Congress: A Political–
Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Proksch S-O and Slapin JB (2008) Position taking in European 
Parliament Speeches. American Journal of Political Science 
52(3): 705–722.
Proksch S-O and Slapin JB (2012) Institutional foundations of 
legislative speech. American Journal of Political Science 
56(3): 520–537.
8 Research and Politics 
Schulz H and König T (2000) Institutional reform and decision–
making efficiency in the European Union. American Journal 
of Political Science 44(4): 653–666.
Slapin JB and Proksch S-O (2008) A scaling model for estimating 
time-series party positions from texts. American Journal of 
Political Science 52(3): 705–722.
Spirling A and Quinn K (2010) Identifying intraparty 
voting blocs in the UK House of Commons. Jour- 
nal of the American Statistical Association 105(490): 
 447–457.
Taylor AJ (2014) Bill passage speed in the US House: A test of a 
vote buying model of the legislative process. The Journal of 
Legislative Studies 20(3): 285–304.
Tsebelis G (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Turner J (2000) The Tories and Europe. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press.
Woon J and Anderson S (2012) Political bargaining and the tim-
ing of congressional appropriations. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 37(4): 409–436.
